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Who should watch over
refugee law?

UNHCR/L Boscardi

by James C Hathaway

On 13 December 2001, states committed themselves" ... to consider ways that may be required to
strengthen the implementation of the 1951
Convention and/or 1967 Protocol".1 It is wonderful
that after half a century we may finally be on the
verge of taking oversight of the treaty seriously.

I

am concerned, however, that having watched this matter languish
for 50 years, activists may now
feel the need immediately to build on
this new commitment by endorsing
some kind of a mechanism — even if
only a minimally effective one — for
overseeing the Refugee Convention. I
worry that we may allow ourselves to
be rushed into embracing a particular
model for oversight of refugee rights
in order to lock in at least some
progress on this issue, only to find
that we have committed ourselves to
an approach that, in the long run,
really is inadequate.2 While there is of
course the possibility that a minimalist project may provide the experience
and confidence needed to move in a
more ambitious direction in the
future, there is also the possibility
that states will take the view that,
having established a minimalist mechanism, they have ‘dealt with the

supervision question’. Thus, they
might argue, there is no need to revisit the issue, at least in the foreseeable
future.
We simply cannot afford to sell out
the future of refugee protection in a
hasty bid to establish something that
looks, more or less, like an oversight
mechanism for the Refugee
Convention.
To be clear, this debate is not about
how to stay on top of UNHCR as an
agency. UNHCR has a mandate that is
much broader than supervising the
Refugee Convention. In recent years,
its work as a humanitarian relief
agency has, in fact, come to overshadow its core protection functions. Its
work on behalf of the internally displaced has in many instances eclipsed
its primary duty to protect refugees.
It has often taken on roles that put it

into the realm of the political, notwithstanding its explicitly non-political mandate. While there can and
should be initiatives more effectively
to supervise UNHCR as an agency,
these are matters which, to my mind,
are logically entrusted to UNHCR’s
executive committee (EXCOM) or
indeed to the UN Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC). We should not
allow the question of how best to
oversee the Refugee Convention to be
redirected towards difficult but distinct questions of supervising
UNHCR’s compliance with its broader
statutory mandate, much less of how
to monitor the various jobs it has
taken on outside its mandate.
On the other hand, it is equally wrong
for UNHCR to attempt artificially to
cut off debate on the appropriate
range of potential mechanisms to
oversee the Refugee Convention by
reliance on its institutional authority
under Article 35 of the Refugee
Convention.3 As we all know, UNHCR
has a special responsibility under
Article 35 to "supervise the implementation" of the Refugee
Convention. But this provision does
not create a monopoly on treaty
oversight in favour of UNHCR. To
the contrary, the Convention, as an
international pact, is the responsibility of the states that signed it.

Temporary schools
provided by
UNHCR, New
Shamshatoo Camp,
Pakistan
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-------------As the mechanisms for enforcement
of the Convention itself make clear, it
is states that have the fundamental
right and duty to ensure that other
states actually live up to their obligations under the Refugee Convention.
There is nothing in Article 35 which
precludes the states that are both the
objects and the trustees of the
refugee protection system from deciding to establish an arms-length
mechanism to provide general guidance on, and oversight of, the Refugee
Convention. Indeed, a move in this
direction is precisely what I believe is
required now.

Establishing an oversight
mechanism
In considering this task, a first question must surely be: why is it that the
Refugee Convention, virtually alone
among major human rights treaties,
still has no free-standing mechanism
to promote interstate accountability?

I believe that this would be a tragic
error of judgement. UNHCR clearly
makes some essential contributions to
oversight of the Convention via its
supervisory authority codified in
Article 35. In particular, the
Department of International
Protection (DIP) has real expertise in
assisting governments to draft policy
and legislation, in engaging directly
and indirectly in defensive case interventions, and in organising and
conducting refugee law outreach and
training. DIP’s role is complemented
by the critical function of UNHCR’s
Executive Committee, which symbolically reaffirms the
commitment of
states to refugee law
and provides democratic legitimacy to
the agency’s work. There is therefore
no need for a mechanism of international oversight to take on any of
these roles.
But there are also some things that
are usually understood to be central
to a meaningful project of international oversight that UNHCR does less
well and is perhaps not ideally positioned to take on. In practice, neither
DIP nor EXCOM has done enough to
provide systematic, non-crisis policy
guidance on the
substance of

The role of UNHCR
It might be suggested, however, that it
was — and is — the existence of a UN
High Commissioner for Refugees that
distinguishes refugee law from every
other UN human rights project. Only
in refugee law is there an international organisation assigned exclusively to
supervise implementation of the

refugee law, carefully anchored in the
real context of protection challenges.
There has been a lack of leadership in
the design of mechanisms to implement burden and responsibility
sharing so as to enable the imperatives of refugee law duties to be
reconciled to the political and social
realities of asylum states. There has
not really been a genuinely inclusive
range of voices, including those of
refugees themselves, brought into the
supervisory process. And not enough
efforts have been made to empower
local institutions to make enforcement of refugee rights meaningful in
a way that no international institution
can ever aspire to do. These are all
examples of the kinds of work which,
in most other contexts, are entrusted
to an autonomous supervisory body.
Beyond the importance of setting reasonable expectations for the sorts of
supervisory tasks that UNHCR should
itself be expected to take on, there are
two more fundamental reasons why
vesting UNHCR with sole responsibility to oversee the Refugee Convention
is not a credible proposition.

UNHCR is no longer at arms length from
the implementation of refugee protection.

UNHCR/R Chalasani

UNHCR staff warn
returning Kosovan
refugees of the danger
of landmines and
booby traps.

In part, it is a question of history. The
Refugee Convention was the second
major human rights treaty adopted by
the UN, having been preceded only by
the Genocide Convention. It is noteworthy that the Genocide Convention,
like the Refugee Convention, is not
externally supervised. In part, then,
the absence of an external supervisory
mechanism for the Refugee
Convention is simply a reflection of
the historical reality that, in the late
1940s and early 1950s, the entire idea
of interstate supervision of human
rights was new, potentially threatening and not truly accepted by states.
Yet with the adoption of the human
rights covenants and more specialised
treaties beginning in the mid-1960s,
the establishment of an independent
mechanism for interstate oversight of
the human rights treaties has become
routine. Unless there is some good,
principled reason why refugee law
should be immune from this general
commitment, it is high time to reverse
the historical aberration by bringing
the commitment to oversight of
refugee law into line with the practice
in human rights law more generally.

treaty. At best, other UN human rights
treaties can rely on the recently established, generic authority of a (grossly
under-funded) UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights to support the
efforts of part-time supervisory bodies. Because refugee law has its own
institutional guardian in the person of
the High Commissioner, it might be
thought that any additional mechanism for oversight would be
superfluous.

First, UNHCR has been fundamentally
transformed during the 1990s from
an agency whose job was, in large
measure, to serve as trustee or
guardian of refugee rights as implemented by states to an agency that is
now primarily focused on direct service delivery.4 Simply put, UNHCR is
no longer at arms length from the
implementation of refugee protection.
In most big refugee crises around the
world today, UNHCR is — in law or in
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tique and broad guidance on acceptable international practice under the
Refugee Convention. Nor may it be
reasonable to expect UNHCR, as an
interstate organisation, to devise the
sorts of complex political mechanisms — involving international
burden and responsibility sharing —
that are critical to the continued
effectiveness of refugee law in the
modern world.

Medical care for new arrivals from Zaire, Nyaragusu camp, Kasulu District, Tanzania, 1996.

fact — the means by which refugee
protection is delivered on the ground.
UNHCR therefore faces a dilemma.
Either it must return to concentrating
on the implementation of its core
supervisory responsibilities (leaving
to others what has become the majority of its operational mandate) or it
must concede that it cannot ethically
supervise itself and endorse the
establishment of a genuinely armslength body to ensure the oversight of
the Refugee Convention.
Second, the difficulty with relying
solely on UNHCR to oversee the
Refugee Convention is that it encourages states to avoid the meaningful
accountability between and among
themselves that is at the root of the
entire international human rights project. Because states presently take
little if any direct responsibility for
ensuring that their fellow states live
up to international refugee law obligations, the dynamic of persuading,
cajoling and indeed shaming of partner states — so critical to the success
of the international human rights project in general — is largely absent in
refugee law. It is simply too easy to
leave the task to UNHCR.
Yet, as we all know, UNHCR is not
really in a position to apply meaningful forms of pressure on states.
UNHCR is, after all, an entity with a
tiny core budget and is effectively
dependent on the annual voluntary

contributions of a very small number
of powerful states, virtually none of
which has been predisposed to
empower UNHCR to act autonomously
to advance a strong regime of interna-

In short, those of us concerned to
advance refugee protection would be
ill-advised to limit the scope of our
thinking to models that are housed
within, or functionally intertwined
with, the work of UNHCR as an international organisation. By the same
token, UNHCR as an organisation
would be ill-advised to insist that any
mechanism to reinforce oversight of
the Refugee Convention be situated
within its walls. To do so may simply
constrain its operational effectiveness
in protection and other fields, and
reinforce the current sense of despair
among many UNHCR staff whose
expectations are not matched by
either political independence or fiscal
autonomy.

It is critical that we take the time to learn the lessons of treaty
oversight in other parts of the UN system
tional refugee protection. Yes, these
states have been generous in providing funds for refugee relief and for
humanitarian assistance. Too often,
however, they have either avoided or,
on occasion, evaded UNHCR’s insistence on the importance of protection
principles. Recent tragic events off
the coast of Australia and the legally
indefensible domestic reaction to the
attempt to bring international law to
bear on Australia are more than adequate testimony to this problem.
Moreover, because UNHCR is, and will
remain, politically and fiscally constrained by design, it cannot
reasonably be expected to provide the
sort of strong voice in favour of
unflinching attention to refugee protection that is now required. There
may also be no good reason to compromise UNHCR’s on-the-ground
efforts to promote implementation of
the Refugee Convention — which do
frequently require compromise and
even expediency in the interest of saving lives — by forcing that same
organisation to be the source of cri-

The way forward
In light of these realities, we should
not rush from celebration of the critical commitment to enhanced
oversight of the Refugee Convention
secured in Geneva to embrace any
particular model for oversight of the
treaty. It is critical that we take the
time to learn the lessons of treaty
oversight in other parts of the UN
system.5 In particular, the successes
and failures of the six major UN
treaty bodies provide a wealth of
information, both for and against particular modes of oversight, which we
ignore at our peril. At a time when
the chairpersons of all of the UN
human rights treaty bodies insist on
regular coordination and mutual
learning, it would be sadly ironic for
those of us in the refugee protection
community to rush forward to
embrace any model not predicated on
an intimate knowledge of the range of
potential protection options.6 [See box
on next page.]
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-------------Nor should we allow ourselves to be
intimidated by institutional insistence
that oversight of the Refugee
Convention be a function exclusively
of UNHCR. The High Commissioner's duty to supervise implementation of the Convention and the
more general obligation of State
Parties to take collective responsibility to oversee their treaty obligations
are, in fact, compatible — not mutually exclusive — responsibilities.
As no precise model of oversight for
the Refugee Convention will be adopted imminently, there is no need to
rush to embrace any particular
approach. Having waited 50 years, it
is better to take the time to engage in
a solid, broadly-based initiative to
build a mechanism of oversight that
will withstand the test of time. We
must commit ourselves to a process

of learning the lessons of human
rights history and thinking hard and
creatively about the context-specific
goals of overseeing refugee law. Only
on the basis of such a process will we
be able to put forward a model for
serious, genuinely responsive oversight of the Refugee Convention.
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